Who Should Make Medical Decisions for Incompetent Adults? A Critique of RCW 7.70.065 by Quinn, Adrienne E.
Who Should Make Medical Decisions for
Incompetent Adults? A Critique of RCW 7.70.065
Adrienne E. Quinn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in medical technology give us a better chance of
surviving a serious accident or illness than ever before. On a daily
basis, heart attack victims, accident victims, and cancer patients are
treated with new techniques and technologies that keep them alive
longer.1 Survival, however, does not mean that we will be able to
communicate our wishes or be competent enough to make decisions
about our medical treatment. Who, then, should make decisions such
as whether we should undergo surgery or be taken off life support
systems?
Many Washington residents may be surprised to learn that if they
are not competent to make medical decisions for themselves, a parent
seen only at Christmas-time every few years may be called on to make
medical decisions for them, or that their significant other may be
prevented from making medical decisions for them regardless of how
long they have lived together. These situations, and several others, are
described more fully in this Comment in the context of the need to
amend Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 7.70.065, Washington's
medical decision-making statute. To show why the statute should be
rewritten, this Comment discusses: (1) the importance of autonomy
and self-determination in medical decision-making; (2) the purpose of
proxy medical decision-making statutes; (3) Washington's proxy
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1. See, e.g., M. Saklayen et al., In-Hospital Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: Survival in I
Hospital and Literature Review, 74 MED. BALTIMORE 4, 163 (1995) (stating that CPR has been
used extensively since its introduction three decades ago); J. Adolfsson, Radical Prostatectomy,
Radiotherapy or Deferred Treatment for Localized Prostate Cancer? 23 CANCER-SURV. 141, 141
(1995) (discussing technological advancements in the treatment of prostate cancer and resulting
survival rates).
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decision-making statute; and, (4) current family demographics. This
Comment concludes by proposing a new medical decision-making
statute for Washington.2
In crafting medical decision-making statutes, state legislatures
have tried to answer the question of who should make medical
decisions for incompetent patients by looking to the principle of
personal autonomy.3  Personal autonomy, a principle rooted in
Western philosophy, has strongly influenced American law and
bioethics.4 Because the principle of autonomy requires that a patient
make medical decisions for him or herself, legislatures have struggled
to find ways of effectuating an incompetent patient's wishes.'
The Washington legislature, in addressing this problem, has
created a statutory priority list of proxy decisionmakers who are
authorized to make medical decisions for an incompetent patient.
Incompetence is defined as mental illness, developmental disability,
habitual drunkenness, excessive use of drugs or other mental incapaci-
ty.7 Under Washington's proxy decision-making statute, the first two
decisionmakers on the priority list are a court-appointed guardian,
followed by any person to whom the incompetent patient has given his
or her durable powers of attorney for health care.' Because most
incompetent individuals have neither a court appointed guardian, nor
a durable power of attorney for health care decisions, these first two
classes of decisionmakers will rarely apply.'
The classes that follow guardian and a person with durable power
of attorney are most relevant to the majority of people who become
incompetent. Those classes of decisionmakers are, in the order of
priority, spouse, adult children, parents, and adult siblings.'0 No
person outside these four classes of decisionmakers is legally authorized
2. The proposed medical decision-making statute is not modeled after any other state
statute. Rather, it was written by the author to address the specific problems with Washington's
statute.
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1) (1996).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.010(1)(e) (1996).
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(a)-(b).
9. Robert A. Pearlman et al., Advance Care Planning: Eliciting Patient Preferences for Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 26 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 353, 355 (1995) (estimating that only
between 9% and 23% of U.S. citizens have executed a formal written advance directive). See also
Jeffrey S. Janofsky, M.D. & Barry Rovner, M.D., Prevalence of Advance Directives and
Guardianship in Nursing Home Patients, 6 J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY & NEUROLOGY 214, 214
(1993) (stating that between 4% and 17.5% of adults have advance care directives).
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(c)-(f).
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to make decisions for the incompetent patient." Additionally, no
person in one of the authorized classes may make medical decisions for
the incompetent patient if a person in a higher class can be located. 2
The belief underlying the statute is that these classes of decision-
makers, in the order set out by the Washington legislature, will know
and make the same decision that the incompetent patient would make,
were he or she competent.
However, this Comment will demonstrate that the statute and its
exclusive hierarchy of decisionmakers may fail to effectuate an
incompetent patient's wishes for as many as one-third of Washington
residents.'3  The statute's priority list of proxy decisionmakers
assumes that all families consist of two legally married individuals and
their children. As U.S. Census Bureau statistics show, this married-
two-parent family is not the reality for many Washington residents. 4
Family members who are not classified as members of this unit, such
as grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins, or unmarried partners and
close friends are prevented from acting as proxy decisionmakers under
the statutory hierarchy. Furthermore, even among the family members
who are included in the statutory hierarchy, the statute's rigidity does
not allow a family member who is lower on the priority list, though a
more appropriate decisionmaker for the incompetent patient, to be
appointed if a higher priority family member can be contacted."5 The
statute's appointment of proxy decisionmakers based on the degree of
consanguinity or legal relationship rather than the decisionmakers'
demonstrated closeness to or concern for the incompetent patient can
result in the appointment of decisionmakers who have no idea what the
patient would decide were he or she competent. Conversely, people
who may be most likely to know what the incompetent patient would
decide may be excluded from the decision-making process. Thus, the
statute should be rewritten.
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1) (1996).
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(2) (1996).
13. See infra p. 593 and note 74.
14. See infra p. 593 and note 74.
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(2)(a) (1996).
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMY AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN MAKING MEDICAL DECISIONS
The belief that every person has the right to autonomy and self-
determination is deeply rooted in the western philosophical tradi-
tion.16 Because the dominant culture and belief system of the United
States is shaped by this philosophical tradition, the importance of
personal autonomy and self-determination is evident in many facets of
our society, including making medical decisions. This section briefly
shows how the principles of autonomy and self-determination have
influenced American case law and legislation pertaining to medical
decision-making.
The principle of personal autonomy has not always affected a
patient's right in determining what medical treatment he or she will or
will not receive. As long ago as ancient Greece, and as recently as the
nineteenth century, patients' participation in medical decision-making
was minimal because doctors were expected to inspire confidence in
their own medical judgment and maintain patients' hope for a cure. 7
By the early part of the twentieth century, however, the notion that
personal autonomy requires informed consent for medical treatment
became ingrained in American tort law."
In 1891, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right of
personal autonomy. 9 In response to a defendant's request that the
plaintiff in a personal injury action submit herself to a physical
examination, the Court stated, "no right is held more sacred or is more
carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of her own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestion-
able authority of law."20 Thus, the Court affirmed that every person
has a right to control his or her own body.
Justice Cardozo, of the New York Court of Appeals, took the
principle that every person has a right to control his or her own body
one step further. He is widely credited with originating the legal
requirement that the right of personal autonomy mandates that a
16. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW &
ETHICS, 4-24 (1991).
17. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 322
(2d ed. 1991).
18. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at
189-92 (5th ed. 1984).
19. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
20. Id.
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medical practitioner must obtain a patient's consent to medical
treatment.21 In Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, Justice
Cardozo wrote:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages.2
Thus, not only does one have a right to control his or her own body,
but if someone else tries to exert control over another's body, the
person exerting unauthorized control over another's body may be sued.
The right of personal autonomy in medical decision-making has
been recognized by state legislatures as well as courts. For example,
the preamble of Washington's Natural Death Act,23 which permits
terminally ill patients to legally refuse life-sustaining treatment, states
that "adult persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions
relating to the rendering of their own health care."
In medical decision-making, it is not just the patient's consent that
is required, but the patient's informed consent.24 As American tort
law has developed, doctors are required to give their patients sufficient
information so that the patient can make an informed and intelligent
decision on whether to submit to a particular medical treatment.2 A
doctor's responsibility to inform his or her patient of the risks involved
in a particular medical treatment is considered the legal standard of
professional conduct under American tort law.26 Consequently, a
doctor's failure to obtain informed consent gives rise to a cause of
21. A.D. Nieuw, Informed Consent, 12 MED. & L. 125, 125 (1993).
22. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010 (1996).
24. KEETON, supra note 18, at 190.
25. Id.
26. See Nieuw, supra note 21, at 125-26.
'Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination. It
follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body and he may, if he be
sound of mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other
medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of treatment
is desirable or necessary, but the law does not permit him to substitute his own
judgment by any form of artifice or deception. The law requires that the inroads made
upon a person's body take place only with informed voluntary consent of the person.
The patient is entitled to full disclosure of risks, benefits and alternative treatments to
any proposed procedure, both in therapy and in medical experimentation, except in
emergencies or when the patient is incompetent, in which case proxy consent is
required.'
Id. at 125 (quoting Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan. 1960)).
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action for negligence.27 Therefore, when a patient is incompetent and
unable to give informed consent, doctors are in a quandary: How can
doctors provide the patient with the needed medical treatment, preserve
the patient's right of autonomy, and protect themselves from a suit for
negligence for treating the patient without the patient's consent?2
III. THE PURPOSE OF PROXY MEDICAL
DECISION-MAKING STATUTES
State legislatures, including Washington's, have sought to resolve
this quandary by enacting proxy decision-making statutes.29 Proxy
decision-making statutes serve to protect medical practitioners from
liability for treating an incompetent patient and to preserve patient
autonomy, even when the patient is incompetent. Proxy decision-
making statutes protect doctors from liability for treating a patient in
the absence of the patient's informed consent by allowing someone
besides the incompetent patient to give informed consent. As
mentioned above, a doctor's failure to obtain consent from a patient
would give rise to an action for negligence." Proxy decision-making
statutes also are intended to preserve the principle of autonomy by
authorizing an individual who is most likely to know what decisions
the incompetent patient would make to give informed consent on
behalf of the incompetent patient.
Generally, the family is deemed to be the most appropriate proxy
decisionmaker for the incompetent patient.31  The President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research recommends that the family be
designated as proxy decisionmaker for three reasons:
(1) The family is generally most concerned about the good of the
patient;
(2) the family will also usually be most knowledgeable about the
patient's goals, preferences, and values;
27. KEETON, supra note 18, at 190.
28. It should be noted that under the common law doctors may act in an emergency without
informed consent. Judith Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained From Families of Adult
Patients to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 229, 229 (1987) (citing
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (1972)).
29. Id.
30. See supra Part II.
31. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 818, 689 P.2d 1372, 1377 (1984).
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(3) the family deserves recognition as an important social unit to be
treated, within limits, as a single decisionmaker in matters that
intimately affect its members."
The common law in many states, including Washington, also requires
doctors to look to the incompetent patient's family to obtain consent
for medical treatment.3
Some doctors and ethicists are critical of proxy decision-making
because they believe that proxy decision-making does not actually
effectuate the patient's wishes.34 After conducting studies, some
doctors and ethicists concluded that there is not a strong enough
correlation between the decision a family believes the incompetent
patient would make and the decision the patient would make for him
or herself.35
In examining these studies, however, one may draw the opposite
conclusion: There is, in fact, a high correlation between the patient
and proxy decisions. Which conclusion one draws depends on how
one analyzes the data and the credence one gives the statistical theory
used. To begin with, although the authors of these studies claim that
there is not a "high" correlation rate, they fail to define high correla-
tion in any of the studies.36 In almost every study, there was at least
a seventy percent correlation between the choice the patient said that
he or she would choose and the choice that the proxy believed the
patient would make.3 However, the studies' authors did not believe
that correlation rates of at least seventy percent were high.3"
The authors who argue that there is not a high correlation
between the decisions a patient would make and those made by their
32. Paul B. Solnick, M.D., Proxy Consent for Incompetent Non-Terminally Ill Adult Patients,
6 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 19-20 (1985) (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS 182-83 (1982)).
33. For example, in Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 304, 306, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (1967),
the Washington Supreme Court found that consent to surgical treatment for an incompetent
patient must be obtained from a "near relative capable of giving consent."
34. See Linda L. Emanuel, M.D. et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care -A Case for
Greater Use, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 889, 894-95 (1991).
35. See id. See also Jan Hare et al., Agreement Between Patients and Their Self-selected
Surrogates on Difficult Medical Decisions, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1049, 1049-54 (1992);
Allison B. Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are Proxy Predictions?, 115 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 92, 92-97 (1991); Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions
of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY M115, M115-21 (1988).
36. See sources cited supra note 35.
37. Hare, supra note 35, at 1049 (agreement on treatment occurred only 70% of the time);
Seckler, supra note 35, at 94 (agreement between patients and family members on the two
vignettes was 88% and 68%); Uhlmann, supra note 34, at Ml19 (Table 4A) (agreement between
patients and their spouses ranged from 60.7% to 90% depending on the vignette).
38. See sources cited supra note 35.
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proxies drew their conclusions based on the kappa coefficient,39 which
discounts for chance, and not the raw data that showed a seventy
percent correlation. Thus, if one does not base one's conclusion on the
kappa coefficient, but on the raw data, there is actually a high
correlation (at least seventy percent) between patient and proxy
decisions.
There are two other important conclusions from these studies.
First, the studies that compared physician and patient decisions found
that there was a much lower correlation rate between the physician-
patient decisions than the family member-patient decisions.4" This
is further evidence that those closest to the patient should be proxies
for the incompetent patient.
Second, when there was a discrepancy between the treatment the
patient said he or she would select and that which the proxy believed
he or she would select, the discrepancy was due to the surrogate
overestimating the patient's preference to be resuscitated.4 In other
words, the proxies selected by the patient erred on the side of
preserving the patient's life. By contrast, the physicians erred on the
side of removing life support. 2 Because physicians erred on the side
of removing life support, or not resuscitating, and more frequently
made errors about what the patient's actual desires were, the need to
appoint a proxy who is closest to the patient and most likely to know
the patient's wishes is further reinforced.
Rather than showing that proxy decision-making fails to effectuate
an incompetent patient's wishes, these studies show that at least
seventy percent of the time the incompetent patient's wishes are
effectuated. These studies also illustrate one way to improve the
correlation rate: Ensure that the proxy is someone who knows the
incompetent patient well. Doctors, who presumably did not know the
patients as well as the family members knew the patients, failed to
effectuate the patient's wishes more often than did the family members.
39. There are many methods of statistical analysis. The conclusion of these particular
studies-that there is not a high correlation between patient and proxy decisions-is based on the
statistical theory and methodology used, which, in brief, requires that a certain percentage of the
answers be attributed to chance. The statistical number used to represent the correlation between
patient and proxy decisions discounted by chance is called the kappa coefficient.
40. Seckler, supra note 35, at 94 (59% to 72% correlation for patient/physician decisions
compared to 68% and 88% for family/patient decisions); Uhlmann, supra note 35, at Ml19
(Tables 4A and 4B) (correlation for five vignettes was 66.3%, 60%, 51.2%, 75.6%, 89.5% and
53.5% for physicians compared to 75.5%, 70.8%, 53.4%, 61.8%, 90%, and 60.7% for family
members).
41. Seckler, supra note 35, at 95; Uhlmann, supra note 35, at M117.
42. See sources cited supra note 35.
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This observation goes to the heart of this Comment's thesis: Because
Washington's proxy decision-making statute fails to effectuate the
incompetent patient's wishes, it must be revised to ensure that the
person who is appointed proxy for the incompetent patient knows the
patient well.
IV. WASHINGTON'S PROXY DECISION-MAKING
STATUTE: RCW 7.70.065
In assessing why Washington's proxy decision-making statute may
fail to effectuate many incompetent patients' wishes, this section
analyzes the language and structure of the statute and the decision-
making process that the statute creates. It also includes illustrations of
family situations in which the person who is most likely to know the
incompetent patient's wishes is excluded from the decision-making
process.
A. Analysis of RCW 7.70.065
In exploring the complicated issue of who should make medical
decisions for the incompetent patient, the Washington Supreme Court
stated that the legislative, rather than the judicial, process was the
appropriate forum for resolving such complex legal, medical, social,
moral, and ethical issues.43 The Washington legislature addressed
this question in 1987 by enacting RCW 7.70.065. In reading the
statute, the reader should focus on the following: the hierarchy of
decisionmakers, the requirement of unanimity when parents or siblings
are proxies, and the type of relationship one must have with the
incompetent patient to act as the patient's proxy.
RCW 7.70.065 Informed Consent-Persons authorized to provide
for patients who are not competent-Priority.
(1) Informed consent for health care for a patient who is not
competent, as defined in RCW 11.88.010(1)(b), to consent may
be obtained from a person authorized to consent on behalf of
such patient. Persons authorized to provide informed consent
to health care on behalf of a patient who is not competent to
consent shall be a member of one of the following classes of
persons in the following order of priority:
43. Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 821-22, 689 P.2d at 1378-79.
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(a) The appointed guardian of the patient, if any;
(b) The individual, if any, to whom the patient has given
a durable power of attorney that encompasses the authori-
ty to make health care decisions;
(c) The patient's spouse;
(d) Children of the patient who are at least eighteen years
of age;
(e) Parents of the patient; and
(f) Adult brothers and sisters of the patient.
(2) If the physician seeking informed consent for proposed
health care of the patient who is not competent to consent
makes reasonable efforts to locate and secure authorization from
a competent person in the first or succeeding class and finds no
such person available, authorization may be given by any
person in the next class in the order of descending priority.
However, no person under this section may provide informed
consent to health care:
(a) If a person of higher priority under this section has
refused to give such authorization; or
(b) If there are two or more individuals in the same class
and the decision is not unanimous among all available
members of that class.
(3) Before any person authorized to provide informed consent
on behalf of a patient not competent to consent exercises that
authority, the person must first determine in. good faith that
that patient, if competent, would consent to the proposed
health care. If such a determination cannot be made, the
decision to consent to the proposed health care may be made
only after determining that the proposed health care is in the
patient's best interests.
While there are several important aspects of the statute, this
section highlights the benefits and problems particular to each class of
decisionmakers under the statute. The first priority decisionmaker is
a court-appointed guardian." If a guardian is appointed by the
courts, the courts can then intercede in circumstances such as the
following: (1) there is a conflict between family members within the
same class under the statute so that, as the statute directs, none of the
family members may give consent; (2) a family member who disagrees
with the proxy decisionmaker files a petition for guardianship to have
the court appoint a different decisionmaker; (3) the hospital or treating
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(a) (1996).
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physician believes that the statutory decisionmaker is acting contrary
to the patient's wishes or interests; or (4) none of the statutory
decisionmakers are available or competent to give consent for the
incompetent patient's treatment.
While guardianship proceedings may effectively resolve some
conflicts, guardianship proceedings require the family members to seek
legal advice, incur legal costs, and go through cumbersome legal
guardianship proceedings." Thus, cost or lack of knowledge about
the legal system may preclude many people from using guardianship
proceedings. Additionally, guardianship proceedings are not likely to
resolve some of the problems with the statute, such as the exclusion of
certain family members, unmarried partners or lifelong friends. The
reason that guardianship proceedings are unlikely to remedy these
problems is that judges are likely to rely on traditional notions of
family and the statute itself in determining who should be appointed
guardian.46
The second priority decisionmaker under the statute is any
individual to whom the patient has given a durable power of attorney
for health care.4 7 Although this is the ideal method for preserving
patient autonomy, very few people have written a durable power of
attorney for health care. According to one estimate, only between nine
and twenty-three percent of Americans have executed any kind of
formal, written advance directive.48 However, even if someone has
written a durable power of attorney, it may not be valid. There are
strict statutory requirements for a durable power of attorney for health
care to be effective under Washington law.49  For example, the
45. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(a) (1996). Ironically, one of the reasons that
the Washington legislature enacted the statute was to enable the incompetent patient's family to
avoid costly guardianship proceedings. Floor Notes on H.B. 763, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
1987) (stating that "[t]he bill would eliminate the need for appointing a guardian in most cases.
This would facilitate quicker medical treatment for the patient. It would also save the family
court costs associated with the court appointment of the guardian.").
46. Areen, supra note 28, at 229; see also Amy Brown, Note, Broadening Anachronistic
Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1057-
59 (1990) (discussing In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Sharon Kowalski was rendered incompetent after being hit by a drunk driver. The court refused
to appoint Sharon's lesbian partner as guardian despite testimony from the treating nurses that
Sharon was communicating that she wanted her partner to care for her. Instead, the court
appointed Sharon's father guardian even though he called gays and lesbians fruits and queers and
barred Sharon's partner from seeing her.).
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(b) (1996).
48. Pearlman, supra note 9, at 355.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.94.010(1) (1996). The durable power of attorney must either
state "[tIhis power of attorney shall not be affected by disability of the principal," or "[t]his power
of attorney shall become effective upon the disability of the principal," or must include "similar
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durable power of attorney instrument must clearly state that the
instrument is to be effective during the patient's disability50 The
absence of this language renders the durable power of attorney
invalid."1
Additionally, if the person who is given the patient's durable
power of attorney for health care is not on the statute's priority list,
and is the patient's physician, an employee of the physician, or an
owner, administrator, or employee of the health care facility where the
patient resides or receives care, the durable power of attorney for health
care is void. 2 In other words, if an individual gives his or her
durable power of attorney to a significant other, the couple is not
married, and the significant other is a doctor or even a cafeteria worker
in the patient's hospital, the durable power of attorney is invalid.
Thus, even those individuals who take steps to preserve their autono-
my by drafting durable powers of attorney may not have their wishes
followed because of strict or outdated statutory requirements.
Furthermore, for each of the classes set out within the statute's
family priority list in which there may be more than one person in the
class (e.g., parents, children, and siblings), there must be unanimous
agreement among that class of individuals. s3 If unanimity does not
exist, no one is authorized to give consent under the proxy decision-
making statute.5 4 As discussed below, the requirement of unanimity
may prevent an entire class of potential proxies, whether siblings or
parents, from making decisions for the incompetent patient because a
unanimous decision cannot be reached.
Finally, the person who is appointed as proxy must seek to
determine what decision the patient would have made if he or she were
competent."s The statute does not specify what efforts must be made
or who should be questioned in making this determination."6 If the
proxy decisionmaker cannot determine what decision the incompetent
patient would make, the proxy decisionmaker may make the decision
according to "the best interests" of the patient.5 7 The less the proxy
words showing the intent of the principal that the authority conferred shall be exerciseable
notwithstanding the principal's disability." Id.
50. Id.
51. There are no studies of which the author is aware that document the number of power
of attorneys held invalid because of a failure to comply with the statutory requirements.
52. WAsH. REV. CODE § 11.94.010(3) (1996).
53. WAsH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(2)(b) (1996).
54. Id.
55. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.70.065(3) (1996).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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decisionmaker knows the incompetent patient, the more likely the
proxy will resort to "the best interests" test, which may not comport
with the decision that the patient would have made. Under such
circumstances, the statute's purpose of preserving the patient's
autonomy will not be carried out.
Several legal scholars, ethicists, and medical practitioners, though
not analyzing this particular statute, have made general observations
about proxy decision-making. These authors have discussed both the
problem with limiting proxy decisionmakers to immediate family
members and the problem with legislating a hierarchy of deci-
sionmakers58 Noted family law professor Judith Areen has written
that reliance on families as proxy decisionmakers is not without
problems because the family may not include the most knowledgeable
proxy decisionmaker5 9 Other legal scholars and doctors writing
about proxy decision-making echo the concerns raised by Areen. In
some circumstances, the most appropriate decisionmaker will be
excluded because that person is lower in priority or not designated in
the statute at all, there will be no close family member, or there may
be a conflict of interest between the incompetent patient and family
members.60 In such cases, as one ethicist points out, flexibility is
desirable.61
Some ethicists go a step further and argue that imposition of a
hierarchical arrangement, a particular vision of how families ought to
be, in and of itself negates personal and family autonomy. A legal
hierarchy of proxy decisionmakers may fail to effectuate patient
autonomy because "families and close others do not necessarily or even
very commonly come in the neat prearranged hierarchical order
envisioned by legislators."62
These general criticisms of hierarchical decision-making statutes
are applicable to RCW 7.70.065 because the statute imposes a rigid
hierarchy of decisionmakers. This hierarchical arrangement of family
members in proxy decision-making statutes, as these authors argue and
the hypotheticals above illustrate, does not reflect current reality.
58. See Areen, supra note 28, at 233-34; Dan W. Brock, Surrogate Decision Making for
Incompetent Adults: An Ethical Framework, 58 MT. SINAI J. MED. 388, 390 (1991); Erich H.
Loewy, Furthering the Dialogue on Advance Directives and the Patient Self-Determination Act, 3
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHcARE ETHICS 405, 407-08 (1994); Solnick, supra note 32, at 22.
59. See Areen, supra note 28, at 233-34.
60. See Brock, supra note 58, at 390; Solnick, supra note 32, at 22.
61. Brock, supra note 58, at 390.
62. See Loewy, supra note 58, at 407.
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Consequently, statutes such as RCW 7.70.065 impose a decision-
making structure that negates personal autonomy.
B. Illustrations of Family Members Excluded by RCW 7.70.065
Up until this point, the discussion of the statute's shortcomings
has been focusing on theory rather than on the people who are
adversely affected by the statute. The discussion thus far has focused
on the priority of potential decisionmakers in the statute, the require-
ment of unanimity, and the infrequent use of durable powers of
attorney. However, who is actually affected by the statute's shortcom-
ings? The following hypotheticals illustrate the range of family
members and intimate relations who are excluded from the deci-
sionmaker hierarchy of the statute.63
Illustration 1
Derrick is twenty-nine years old and is incompetent due to a rare
genetic disorder. His parents were divorced when he was three.
Derrick's mother was his primary caretaker and has cared for Derrick
as his condition has deteriorated over the last three years. Derrick's
father rarely paid the required child support as Derrick was growing
up and only saw Derrick about once every year or two. Derrick's
doctors believe that Derrick is a good candidate for an experimental
treatment, which, if successful, may enable Derrick to lead a fairly
normal life, but if unsuccessful will likely result in Derrick's death.
Derrick had often indicated to his mother that he would take any risk
if by doing so he might be cured. The doctors are obligated to obtain
permission from both parents under the statute. Derrick's father
refuses to consent to the treatment.
Illustration 2
Jasmine and Charlie have lived together as significant others for
six years. Both of Charlie's parent's are deceased, though he has a
younger brother to whom he has never been particularly close. When
Charlie is critically injured in a car accident, the hospital seeks consent
for certain surgical procedures from his brother, rather than Jasmine,
because an unmarried partner cannot give consent for treatment under
the current version of the statute.
63. See infra Part V, which uses U.S. Census Bureau Statistics to show the number of
Washington residents represented by each of these hypotheticals.
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Illustration 3
Monique is twenty-one years old. She has lived with her
grandmother who has raised her since Monique was three years old.
Monique's mother is a substance abuser and has been in and out of
Monique's life depending on whether she is clean and sober or on a
substance binge. Monique is shot at a party after a fight breaks out
between two individuals standing near Monique. Because grandparents
are excluded from the statute's hierarchy, the hospital is legally
obligated to consult with Monique's mother to gain consent for
Monique's treatment.
Illustration 4
Richard and Doug, who consider themselves to be life partners,
have been together for twelve years. Doug, dying from complications
due to AIDS, has had infrequent contact with his family over the past
fifteen years. He has never come out to his family because he believes
they would condemn him because of his homosexuality. Doug has not
written out a medical durable power of attorney. He has, however,
told Richard, emphatically, that he does not want to be maintained on
a respirator or other life support systems. When Doug becomes
incompetent, the hospital contacts his parents in Ohio, because Richard
may not legally give consent to Doug's treatment. Doug's parents are
shocked and outraged when they find out that Doug is gay and is
dying from complications due to AIDS. Over Richard's objections,
Doug's parents order the hospital to maintain Doug on a respirator.
Illustration 5
Kathryn lives in a wealthy suburb of Seattle with her four
children, ages twelve to five. She and her husband have been
separated, though not legally, for nearly a year. Kathryn's parents,
who live in the same city, have been tremendously supportive of her
in her struggle to put her life back together. When Kathryn is
rendered incompetent due to a car accident, the statute requires that
the hospital first seek consent from her husband for nonemergency
surgery. Kathryn's parents are excluded from decision-making because
if there is someone available from a higher priority class, here a spouse,
the lower priority class may not be consulted.
Illustration 6
Diane, aged thirty-three, is an only child. Her father passed away
when she was six and her mother passed away just last year. Diane
and her cousin Sharon have been like sisters their whole lives. After
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feeling ill for over a month, Diane is diagnosed with leukemia and her
condition degenerates very quickly. Within six weeks she is incompe-
tent. Sharon has been at her side continuously. Diane, refusing to
believe that she was dying, would not fill out a medical durable power
of attorney. After Diane becomes incompetent, Diane's doctors may
not turn to Sharon to make decisions, because cousins are not listed in
the statute.
Illustration 7
Eileen McCafferty has lived in the same eastern Washington
community for all of her seventy-two years. She has one child, Mike,
who she sees about once a year. She speaks to him on the phone about
once every two or three months. Mrs. McCafferty and Etta Jones have
been each other's closest friend since the two women graduated from
high school together in 1936. Each morning Eileen and Etta walk the
one mile trail around the lake and then have coffee at Etta's house.
One morning Eileen collapses and never regains consciousness.
Although Etta knows Eileen better than anyone, the hospital must seek
consent from Eileen's son, Mike, for Eileen's medical treatment.
In each of the illustrations above, the person or persons who are
most likely to know what the incompetent patient's wishes would be
are precluded from making medical decisions for the incompetent
patient by RCW 7.70.065. Conversely, in each illustration an
individual who has had little contact with the incompetent patient and
is unlikely to know the incompetent patient's wishes is the designated
decisionmaker from whom a doctor must obtain consent.
The reasons that the statute may preclude those most likely to
know the patient's wishes from making medical decisions for the
incompetent patient are twofold. First, as discussed below, the statute
makes certain presumptions about families that prove to be erroneous.
For instance, it seems to presume that one is always married to his or
her significant other. Also, it operates under the assumption that both
parents are equally aware of what decisions their adult child would
make should the adult child become incompetent.
The second reason the statute may lead to relying on a family
member unfamiliar with the incompetent patient's wishes is the
statute's rigid hierarchy. For example, in Illustration 5, the parents,
rather than the spouse, are the more appropriate decisionmakers under
the statute. However, the statute does not allow for any flexibility.
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V. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE FAMILY
The assertion that this traditional configuration of the family does
not reflect current reality is supported by U.S. Census Bureau statistics
on the family." These statistics illustrate that the traditional family,
a married couple living with their children, is no longer a reality for
millions of Americans. As the tables below illustrate, there has been
a dramatic decline in the number of two-parent families, a larger
percentage of the population has never married than in previous
decades, more people live alone than ever before, and there has been
a sharp rise in what the census bureau labels "nonfamily house-
holds."6 Additionally, there are important differences in how family
is defined among different ethnic groups.66 Therefore, as the statistics
discussed below illustrate, the family hierarchy used in the statute does
not reflect current reality.
A. Rise in Single-Parent Families
Table 1 illustrates that there has been an 18% decline in the
percentage of U.S. households with children that are comprised of two
parents residing with their children (87% in 1970 to 69% in 1994).
Conversely, there has been an 18% increase in the number of single-
parent households over this same time period. Numerically, there were
141,964 single-parent households in Washington in 1990, according to
the 1990 census.67
64. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING, WASHINGTON, Summary Tape File 3A (1990).
65. The U.S. Census Bureau does not define "nonfamily household." However, every
household that does not meet the Census Bureau's definition of "family household" is a nonfamily
household. Family, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, consists of a householder and one or
more other persons living in the same household who are related to the householder by birth,
marriage or adoption. See id. at Appendix B-15.
66. See infra Part V(D).
67. See CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, supra note 64 at 7.
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Table 1
Family Household Composition, 1970-1994
(percent distribution)a
1970 1980 1990 1994
Two Parent 87 79 72 69
Family Groups
One Parent 13 22 28 31
Family Groups
Maintained by 12 19 24 27
Mother
Maintained by 1 2 4 4
Father
a. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Table No. 71. Family
Groups with Children Under 18 Years Old, by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1970 to
1994, Statistical Abstract of the United States, at 61 (1995).
The significance of a large percentage of children growing up in single
family households, for the purposes of the proxy decision-making
statute, is that when a young, unmarried person is rendered incompe-
tent, the statute directs that consent be obtained from the "parents of
the patient."6 The statute apparently assumes that.parents, plural,
will have knowledge of the incompetent patient's wishes.
Illustration 1, in which Derrick's absentee father refused to give
permission for Derrick's treatment, is one scenario in which a parent
may have no knowledge of an adult child's wishes, in marked contrast
to the other parent. The statute requires that reasonable efforts be
made to locate both parents and, if both parents are located, the statute
is clear that both parents must agree to the treatment.69 Therefore,
the parents, irrespective of the tenuousness of their relationship with
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(e) (1996).
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(2)(b) (1996). No person listed in the statutory hierarchy
may give consent if "there are two or more individuals in the same class and the decision is not
unanimous among all available members of the dass." Id.
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the incompetent patient, or with each other, must agree to the
treatment. In addition, there is no requirement that each parent have
had frequent, or even any, contact with the incompetent patient. If no
agreement is reached between the parents, the treating physician must
look to the courts to appoint a guardian. The family, therefore, will
have to incur legal costs, miss work, undergo the stress of a legal
proceeding and, in all probability, wind up with the primary caretaker
parent being appointed as guardian.
In addition to the problem of the unanimity requirement, the
prevalence of single-parent families also illustrates the problems within
the mandatory hierarchy of family decisionmakers. The statute
imposes a blanket rule that consent must be sought from a parent over
and above other family members, regardless of the various family
members' demonstrated concern for the patient and knowledge of the
patient's wishes. Therefore, when the parent who had been the
primary caretaker is deceased or incompetent herself, a parent who has
been predominantly an absentee parent of the incompetent adult
patient must give consent to treatment for the incompetent patient.7 °
In this case, adult siblings, who may have a much closer relationship
with the incompetent patient than the absentee parent, may be more
appropriate decisionmakers. Siblings, however, are precluded from
being decisionmakers if there is a parent who can be contacted.7"
Grandparents and other relatives are not even considered in the statute.
It is evident that in enacting RCW 7.70.065, the legislature
assumed that all families are comprised of two-parent households, and
that both parents are close enough to their adult children to know what
treatment their child would choose if competent. However, Census
Bureau statistics show that two-parent families are not a reality for
141,964 households in Washington. While these statistics do not show
how many of these single-family households have a parent not residing
in the household who nevertheless is active in his or her children's
lives, for many people raised in single-parent families, the statute may
fail to effectuate their wishes by requiring consent from both parents,
regardless of whether or not both parents were active in their lives.
B. Decline in Number of People Who Marry
Just as the statute erroneously assumes that both parents have
been active in their children's lives, it also wrongly assumes that the
patient is married. It ignores the possibility of a significant other.
70. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065 (1996).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 7 .7 0.065(2)(a) (1996).
1997]
Seattle University Law Review
Under the statute's hierarchy, the spouse is the first priority of the
family decisionmakers.72 By placing the spouse as the first priority
medical decisionmaker for an incompetent patient, the statute assumes
that a person's significant other (i.e., spouse) will be most knowledge-
able of the patient's wishes. Though that assumption may indeed be
correct, the statute wrongly assumes that all people are married to their
significant others.
As Table 2 illustrates, the percentage of the population over age
eighteen that has never married has increased from 16.2% in 1970 to
23.3% in 1994. In Washington, 923,372 people over age fifteen have
never married.73
Table 2
Marital Status of Individuals 18 Years Old and Over
(percent)a
1970 1980 1990 1994
Never Married 16.2 20.3 22.2 23.3
Married 71.7 65.5 61.9 60.6
Widowed 8.9 8.0 7.6 7.0
Divorced 3.2 6.2 8.3 9.2
a. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Table No. 58. Marital
Status of the Population, by Sex, Race, Hispanic Origin: 1970 to 1984, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, at 52 (1995).
However, many of these individuals who have never married do live
with other individuals. As illustrated by Table 3, nearly a third of the
population lives in "nonfamily households."
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1)(c) (1996).
73. See CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, supra note 64, at 8.
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Table 3
Comparison of Family and Nonfamily Households
(percent)a
1970 1980 1990
Family Households 81.1 73.7 70.8
Nonfamily Householdsb  18.9 26.3 29.1
Male Householderc 6.4 10.9 12.4
Female Householder 12.4 15.3 16.7
One Person' 17.1 22.6 24.6
a. Derived from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Table 65.
Households, Families, Subfamilies, Married Couples, and Unrelated Individuals:
1960 to 1994, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (1995).
b. Nonfamily households are divided into either households with a male house-
holder (head of house) or female householder.
c. Householder: one person in each household is designated as the householder.
In most cases, this is the person, or one of the persons, in whose name the home
is owned, being bought, or rented and who is listed in column 1 of the census
questionnaire. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990
Census of Population and Housing, Summary Social, Economic and Housing
Characteristics Washington, at Appendix B-15 (1990).
d. One person households are a subset of nonfamily households and include both
male and female householders who live alone.
In Washington, there were 599,281 nonfamily households
counted in the 1990 Census (32% of all Washington households).7 4
Of these nonfamily households, 86,772 households identified them-
selves as "unmarried partner households." Thus, at least 173,544
people in Washington live with someone in an intimate relationship,
though those intimate partners are invisible in Washington's medical
decision-making hierarchy. Consequently, as shown by Illustration 2,
Jasmine and Charlie, an unmarried couple who live together, and
74. See id. at 7.
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Illustration 4, Doug and Richard, a gay couple, the statute may not
effectuate the wishes of incompetent patients because it excludes
unmarried partners from the statutory hierarchy of decisionmakers.
Thus, for this sizable group of people, the statute does not achieve its
purpose.
C. Numbers of Washington Families Living With Extended Family
Even among "family" households, as Table 4 illustrates, people
often live with individuals who are not immediate family members. In
Washington in 1990, 44,584 children lived with a grandparent present
in the house. The statistics do not show if the grandparent is the head
of the household or if the child's parents are also present in the
household. Even if the grandparent has been the child's primary
caretaker, RCW 7.70.065 makes no provision for grandparents to be
proxy decisionmakers.7" These families are represented by Illustration
3, in which Monique's grandmother is not able to consent to
Monique's treatment even though she has raised Monique.
Additionally, as Table 4 also illustrates, 97,358 Washingtonians
live with relatives other than their spouse, children or grandchildren.
Even though tens of thousands of Washington residents live with
grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins, who may well know what
treatment these Washington residents would choose for themselves, if
they were able to do so, these family members are excluded from
RCW 7.70.065's list of decisionmakers.
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(1) (1996).
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Table 4
Washington Population by Household Type'
Relationship to
Family Householder Number
Number of Family Householdsb 1,276,227
(number of householders)
Spouse 1,045,661
Child
Natural 1,344,689
Stepchild 89,886
Grandchild 44,584
Other Relatives 97,358
Nonrelatives 88,969
a. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Census of Population and
Housing, 1990, Washington, Summary Tape File 3 (1990).
b. All categories of people in this table are listed by their relationship to the
householder (head of house). For example, spouse represents the householder's
spouse, child represents the householder's child(ren).
D. Cultural Differences in the Definition of Family
The current legal hierarchy for proxy decisionmakers also does
not take into account how cultural differences between different racial
or ethnic groups affect who should make life or death decisions and
how they should be made. For example, "family" is often defined in
much broader terms in ethnic groups than in the dominant culture.
"Play" relatives within the African-American community refer to
individuals who have become members of a family through their close
relationship and commitment to the family rather than through blood
or marriage.76 One may have "play" sisters, aunts, uncles and
76. Robin Terrell Tucker, Patient Self-Determination Act: An African American Perspective,
3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHiCs 417, 418 (1994).
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cousins.77 These "play" family members are considered as much a
part of the family as people related by blood or marriage.78
In sum, the concept of family underlying RCW 7.70.065 does
not reflect the reality of many families in Washington or in current
U.S. society as a whole. Nearly a third of Washington's population
lives in "nonfamily households."7 9 More than a quarter of family
households are maintained by single parents.80 People are marrying
less often and divorcing more frequently. Tens of thousands of
Washingtonians live with members of their extended families.81
There are differences among ethnic groups as to who is considered
family. Therefore, it should not be presumed or legislated that those
who best know an incompetent patient's wishes are only the immediate
family members in the following order: spouse, adult children,
parents, and adult siblings.
VI. SOLUTIONS
As Part V of this Comment illustrates, no single definition of
"family" currently describes all families. Nor does a family relation-
ship mean that one will know the wishes of a family member who
becomes incompetent. Therefore, RCW 7.70.065, which is based on
a single definition of "family" and the presumption that only those
family members will know what decision an incompetent person would
make, should be revised to reflect the reality of families today.
Specifically, four changes should be made to Washington's proxy
medical decision-making statute. First, general practitioners should be
required to discuss advance directives and medical durable powers of
attorney with their patients. This can be accomplished by enacting a
new statute designed to encourage the use of durable powers of
attorney and other advance care directives.
Second, the definition of "family" in RCW 7.70.065 should be
amended to include relatives other than immediate family members.
This change should be made to reflect the current reality of what
"family" is for tens of thousands of Washington's citizens. In
addition, close friends should be allowed to act as surrogate decision-
makers in appropriate circumstances.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra Table 3.
80. See supra Table 1.
81. See supra Table 4.
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Third, the hierarchy in RCW 7.70.065 should be eliminated by
amending Washington's statutes on proxy decision-making and durable
powers of attorney. Fourth, hospital ethics committees, rather than the
courts, should be a first resort for families having difficulty deciding
the appropriate proxy. This change also can be accomplished by
amending the proxy decision-making statute.
Although each of these proposed amendments eliminates some
of the problems discussed above, new problems or uncertainties may
arise from the newly formulated statute. However, the benefits of the
proposed new statutory scheme far outweigh its potential problems.
Each of these proposed changes, as well as sample language for the
proposed statutes, is discussed in detail in the following section.
A. Requiring General Practitioners to Discuss Advance Directives and
Durable Powers of Attorney With Their Patients
Currently, the federal Patient Self-Determination Act requires
caregivers to ask a patient entering any hospital, hospice, nursing
home, managed care organization, or home health care organization
that receives Medicare or Medicaid funds if the patient has an advance
care directive.8 2 Additionally, the physician must inform a patient of
any state laws that pertain to medical durable powers of attorney and
living wills.8 3 The patient's directives must then be documented in
the patient's medical record. 4
Unfortunately, not all patients are capable of engaging in these
discussions when entering a hospital. The patient may already be
incompetent. If a patient has already discussed his or her wishes about
care with a physician while the patient was still healthy, the patient's
wishes would be known by the physician in the event the patient
becomes incompetent. To eliminate the problem of having the
required discussion about advance care directives occur too late in the
patient's treatment, that is, after the patient is already incompetent,
these discussions should be required at an earlier point in the patient's
medical treatment. A revision to Washington law should require that
general practitioners discuss advance directives and medical decision-
making with their patients during routine examinations and document
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (1995); see also P.V. Caralis et al., The Influence of Ethnicity and
Race on Attitudes Toward Advance Directives, Life-Prolonging Treatments, and Euthanasia, 4 J.
CLINIcAL ETHics 155, 155 (1993).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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the patients' decisions in their medical records.8 5 Furthermore, there
should be a requirement that these discussions reoccur every five to ten
years.
Doctors, health care facilities, and insurers may be concerned
about the cost of doctors' time for discussing these issues with patients.
Some would argue that fifteen minutes spent with every patient on the
patient's first visit and then at five-year intervals thereafter will be
costly. That doctors, insurers, health maintenance organizations and,
ultimately, patients, will have to bear the cost of the doctors' time
spent discussing advance care directives and medical durable powers
of attorney is undeniable.
However, one study that examined the time it would take for
doctors and patients to discuss these issues and fill out a form found
that the time required was minimal.8 6 This study found that the
discussion could be coupled with the use of documents, such as
medical directives, which most patients were able to finish in fifteen
minutes or less." The authors of the study believed that the visit
involves a small amount of time that is well-justified by the physician's
ethical duty to inform the patient and preserve patient autonomy.88
Therefore, as this study concludes, the concern about excessive costs
associated with requiring physicians to discuss advance care directives
or medical durable powers of attorney with their patients is outweighed
by the benefit.
Furthermore, spending fifteen minutes with a patient explaining
a durable power of attorney and other medical directives could save the
physician and third-party payers time and money if and when the
patient becomes incompetent. Currently, when a patient is incompe-
tent, the physician must make reasonable efforts to locate family
members and determine who under the statutory scheme is the
appropriate proxy.9 If a patient already has a durable power of
attorney for health care in his or her medical records, the time the
physician must expend to find the appropriate decisionmaker if a
patient becomes incompetent is lessened considerably.
85. Linda L. Emanuel, M.D. & Ezekiel S. Emanuel, M.D., The Medical Directive: A New
Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 26 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3288, 3291 (1989) (discussing
patients' end of life decisions with them has long been considered part of a physician's ethical
responsibility).
86. Emanuel, supra note 34, at 895.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065(2) (1996).
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Another concern that might be raised in requiring physicians to
discuss advance directives and durable powers of attorney with their
patients is that fifteen minutes with a physician will not allow a patient
enough time to make weighty decisions such as (1) who do I want to
have my medical durable power of attorney, or (2) do I want to be
resuscitated should the need arise? The author of this Comment has
found no study examining the question of whether decisions made in
fifteen minutes concerning durable powers of attorney or advance
directives comport with decisions a patient would make given more
time. Common sense, however, leads to the conclusion that if a
patient has thought about these issues, though has never filled out the
proper documents, then fifteen minutes would be sufficient. But, if a
patient has never thought about advance directives or durable powers
of attorney, fifteen minutes is probably insufficient to make such
weighty decisions.
To alleviate this problem, a patient could be prompted to think
about advance directives or medical durable powers of attorney prior
to his or her first visit during which the physician will discuss these
issues. The physician or health maintenance organization should send
a pamphlet, written in easily understandable language describing the
function of advance care directives and medical durable powers of
attorney and the medical situations in which these documents would
be used. Thus, although a fifteen minute discussion with a physician
may be insufficient for some patients, the patient can be prompted to
think about advance directives or medical durable powers of attorney
by being sent an information pamphlet prior to the patient's first visit
with the physician.
In order to ensure that physicians will send their patients
information pertaining to advance care directives and medical durable
powers of attorney and that physicians discuss this information with
their patients, physicians should be required by statute to carry out
these two tasks. The following proposed statute, modeled after the
federal Patient Self-Determination Act,90 would ensure that a larger
percentage of Washingtonians have durable powers of attorney or
medical directives, thereby preserving their autonomy.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc() (1995).
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Proposed Washington Patient Self-Determination Act
(1) Every physician licensed by the State of Washington shall
provide written information to all adult individuals to whom
that physician provides medical care concerning an individual's
rights under Washington law (whether statutory or as recog-
nized by the courts of Washington) to make decisions concern-
ing such medical care, including the right to accept or refuse
medical or surgical treatment and the right to formulate
advance directives under RCW 70.122.030 and the right to
appoint a medical durable power of attorney under RCW
11.94.010.
(2) Every physician shall provide the written information
described in section (1) to the patient prior to the patient's first
visit with the physician.
(3) Every physician shall document in the medical records of
each patient when they treat the patient
(a) whether or not the patient has executed a living will;
(b) whether or not the patient has executed a durable
power of attorney for health care;
(c) if the patient has executed a living will or durable
power of attorney, the physician shall ask the patient to
send a copy of such document(s) to the physician and the
physician shall place such document(s) in the patient's
medical record;
(d) if the patient already has a living will or durable power
of attorney in his or her medical records, the physician
shall ask the patient if the directive(s) are still current and
note the patient's response in the medical records. If the
directive(s) are not current, the doctor shall have the
patient change the directive(s) to make them current, and
have the patient initial the changes.
B. Broadening the Definition of Family and Including Close Friends
in the List of Potential Proxy Decisionmakers
Although the increased use of durable powers of attorney for
health care and other advance directives will decrease the need for a
statute to authorize proxy decisionmakers, not all Washingtonians who
become incompetent will have completed durable powers of attorney
for healthcare.9 Consequently, the need for statutory proxies will
persist. In order to carry out the purpose of a statute for proxy
91. Janofsky & Rovner, supra note 9, at 214 (between 4% and 17.5% of adults have advance
care directives); Pearlman, supra note 9, at 355.
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decisionmaking, i.e., appointing a proxy that is most likely to know the
incompetent patient's wishes, the current statute for proxy decision-
making should be amended. The statute should reflect the fact that at
least one-third of Washington residents do not live within a traditional
family unit.92 Specifically, Washington's statute for proxy deci-
sionmaking should include unmarried partners, relatives other than
immediate family members, and close friends who are, in effect,
considered "family" by the incompetent patient. These changes will
ensure that those who are closest to the patient, and therefore those
most likely to know the patient's wishes, will not be excluded from the
proxy decision-making process.
Opposition to amending the definition of family under RCW
7.70.065 may be voiced by those who believe that a majority of
Washingtonians live in a traditional nuclear family and that broadening
the definition of "family" will contribute to the breakdown of the
traditional family. First, critics may argue that there is no point in
changing the definition of family because for the majority of Washing-
tonians, the current definition of family fits: that is, a majority of
Washingtonians live in the traditional nuclear family.93 However,
this argument ignores the fact that for as many as one-third of
Washington residents, the current definition of family under RCW
7.70.065 does not fit. 94 The effect of this lack of fit is that life and
death decisions may be made by a family member who has little or no
idea of what decision the incompetent individual would make for him
or herself.
A decision such as whether or not an incompetent patient should
be resuscitated while hospitalized is too important to be made by
someone who is unfamiliar with the patient's wishes, particularly when
someone who knows the patient's wishes may be available to make that
decision instead. Therefore, the argument that the statute probably
works for up to two-thirds of Washingtonians is too simplistic in the
face of the importance of the decisions being made by the proxy.
Because the definition of "family" under RCW 7.70.065 can be
amended to encompass more than simply a majority of Washington
families, the statute should be amended to increase its effectiveness.
A second argument raised in opposition to broadening the
definition of "family" is that doing so will contribute to the breakdown
of the traditional family. This argument erroneously focuses on one
92. See supra Part V.
93. See supra Part V.
94. See supra Part V.
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of the symptoms of the decline of the traditional family, rather than the
cause of the decline. That is, some family members will not know the
wishes of an incompetent family member because of a breakdown in
the traditional family. Just as the current definition of "family" does
not keep families together, a broadened definition of "family" will not
tear families apart. The statute's definition of "family" should merely
reflect reality.
It is important for the definition of "family" to reflect reality
because the purpose of the statute is to select a proxy decisionmaker
who is familiar with the incompetent patient's wishes, thereby
preserving the personal autonomy of the incompetent patient. Thus,
RCW 7.70.065 should be amended because broadening the definition
of "family" and permitting close friends who are considered "family"
to be proxy decisionmakers will preserve patient autonomy for a greater
number of Washingtonians.
C. Eliminating the Hierarchy Under RCW 7.70.065
Broadening the definition of "family" under RCW 7.70.065,
however, will not resolve all of the problems with the statute. In many
circumstances, there are family members who are equally close to the
incompetent patient, and, therefore equally capable of knowing or
figuring out what the incompetent patient's wishes would be, yet are
not included in the legal hierarchy of decisionmakers. To elaborate, an
incompetent patient's parents and spouse might know equally well
what decision an incompetent would make for himself or herself. Or,
for example, the parents and siblings might be equally familiar with
the incompetent patient's wishes.
Consequently, the statute should encourage family members to
discuss what the incompetent patient would want and to come to a
consensus about the decision that the incompetent patient would make,
were he or she competent. The family's shared knowledge of the
patient's values, wishes, and past statements may make it more likely
that the treatment decision that is made by the family will accurately
reflect. the patient's wishes.
D. Utilizing the Hospital Ethics Committee
Under some circumstances, it will not be possible for the family
to reach a consensus about the medical treatment that the incompetent
patient would choose. In these circumstances one person will have to
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be appointed as proxy decisionmaker9 Rather than resorting to the
cumbersome, slow, and expensive legal guardian proceedings, an
alternative exists. Hospital ethics committees provide a ready-made
forum for resolving disputes concerning medical ethics and treatment
decisions. 6 These committees are frequently made up of a lawyer, a
member of the community, a physician (who is not the treating
physician), a nurse, a social worker and a hospital administrator. The
hospital ethics committee could be a valuable tool in resolving the
dispute over which family member is the most appropriate proxy
decisionmaker.
The benefits of having a hospital ethics committee make the
initial determination as to the most appropriate proxy are that it is
quicker and less expensive than going through a guardianship
proceeding and some of the members of the committee, such as the
social worker, bring special professional expertise in understanding and
evaluating family or other interpersonal relationships. An additional
benefit is that the hospital ethics decision is appealable and any family
member who is dissatisfied with the decision can file a legal guardian-
ship petition with the courts at any time. Further, having a hospital
ethics committee determine who should be appointed as the proxy
decisionmaker alleviates the concern that if the family does not agree
on a treatment decision, the physician will select as a proxy the family
member who agrees with the physician's treatment choice.97
Some may argue that having the hospital ethics committee
involved in helping the family resolve any disputes over the most
appropriate proxy is merely another hoop for the family to jump
through in making a decision for the incompetent patient. However,
mediation has been recognized as an effective tool in resolving disputes
inexpensively, while at the same time preserving the relationships
among the parties that might otherwise be damaged through the
adversarial process. While requiring that families first attempt
mediation through the hospital ethics committee will be another hoop
for families if the mediation fails, for families where the mediation is
successful, family relationships will be preserved and the dispute will
be resolved more quickly. Because the benefits of preserving family
relationships at the difficult time when a loved one becomes incompe-
tent far outweigh the several hours spent in mediation, the hospital
95. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065 (1996).
96. Areen, supra note 28, at 234; Solnick, supra note 32, at 44-46.
97. Solnick, supra note 32, at 42-43.
1997]
Seattle University Law Review
ethics committee should be involved in resolving disputes over the
appropriate proxy decisionmaker.
The statute can mandate that in choosing the proxy the
committee consider the following factors: (1) with whom the incompe-
tent patient resided before becoming incompetent; (2) who of the
eligible decisionmakers was in close contact with the incompetent
patient over the years immediately prior to the patient becoming
incompetent; (3) who shared an intimate relationship with the patient;
(4) who has discussed the patient's wishes concerning medical
treatment with the incompetent patient before the patient became
incompetent; and, (5) who has cared for and will continue to care for
the incompetent patent.
E. Proposed Proxy Decision-Making Statute
The following amended version of RCW 7.70.065 addresses the
concerns discussed in this Comment by broadening the class of
potential proxies, eliminating the hierarchy of potential decisionmakers,
encouraging discussion among family members, and using hospital
ethics committees to resolve disputes over who should be appointed
proxy in the event that the family (including close friends) is not able
to make that decision.9"
Proposed Proxy Decision-Making Statute
(1) Definitions:
(a) family: for the purposes of this statute shall include
any person related to the incompetent patient by blood,
marriage or adoption, the unmarried partner of the
incompetent patient, and any person who has demon-
strated a sincere, long-standing interest in the welfare of
the patient.
(b) hospital ethics committee: for the purposes of this
statute is a committee formed by a hospital that, at a
minimum, includes the following members: a lawyer, a
member of the community, a physician (who is not the
treating physician), a nurse, a social worker and a hospital
administrator.
(c) unmarried partner: for the purposes of this statute
shall include a person over the age of eighteen with whom
the incompetent person, immediately prior to becoming
incompetent, shared a committed, intimate relationship.
98. These proposed changes necessitate amending RCW 11.94.010(3), the durable power
of attorney statute. A discussion of why amendments are necessary follows infta.
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Evidence of such a relationship may include documenta-
tion of commitment; whether the couple commingles
funds, owns property together, lives together; parents
children together; have named each other as beneficiaries
in wills, pension plans or insurance policies; whether they
hold themselves out to the community as a couple.
(2) Informed consent for health care for a patient who is not
competent, as defined in RCW 11.88.010(1)(b), to consent may
be obtained from a person authorized to consent on behalf of
such patient. Persons authorized to provide informed consent
to health care on behalf of a patient who is not competent shall
be a member of one of the following classes of persons in the
following order of priority:
(a) The appointed guardian of the patient, if any;
(b) The individual, if any, to whom the patient has given
a durable power of attorney that encompasses the authori-
ty to make health care decisions;
(c) A relative or friend who is age eighteen or older and
who has demonstrated a sincere, long-standing interest in
the welfare of the incompetent patient.
(3) The treating physician seeking informed consent must make
reasonable efforts to contact (1) the patient's spouse or unmar-
ried partner; (2) one of the patient's parents; and (3) any person
who has presented him or herself at the hospital and who may
be an eligible decisionmaker under the criteria in section (1)(c).
(4) The treating physician shall request that the family reach a
consensus about the treatment decision that the incompetent
patient would have made were he or she competent.
(5) If the family is not able to reach consensus within a
reasonable time, usually within twenty-four hours for a
nonemergency treatment decision, the hospital ethics committee
shall meet with family members or speak with concerned family
members via telephone and the hospital ethics committee shall
decide who of the eligible decisionmakers shall be the proxy
decisionmaker.
(6) If the patient's condition, in the opinion of the treating
physician, requires that a medical decision be made sooner than
twenty-four hours, the treating physician shall set a shorter
time period for the family's decision-making process. The
physician shall inform the hospital ethics committee of the need
for the shorter time period.
(7) The hospital ethics committee shall consider the following
criteria in determining who the proxy decisionmaker should be:
19971
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(a) with whom the incompetent patient resided before
becoming incompetent;
(b) who of the eligible decisionmakers was in close contact
with the incompetent patient over the last few years;
(c) who shared an intimate relationship with the patient;
(d) who has discussed the patient's wishes concerning
medical treatment with the incompetent patient before the
patient became incompetent;
(e) if applicable, who has cared for and will continue to
care for the incompetent patent.
(8) Before any person authorized to provide informed consent
on behalf of a patient not competent to consent exercises that
authority, the person must first determine in good faith that
that patient, if competent, would consent to the proposed
health care. If such a determination cannot be made, the
decision to consent to the proposed health care may be made
only after determining that the proposed health care is in the
patient's best interests.
By broadening the definition of "family," permitting close friends
to be proxy decisionmakers when appropriate, eliminating the hierarchy
of decisionmakers, and requiring that the hospital ethics committee
mediate disputes, the proposed proxy decision-making statute will
preserve patient autonomy for a greater number of Washington
residents. However, to effectuate all the changes under the proposed
proxy decision-making statute, RCW 11.94.010(3) also must be
amended.
F. Necessary Amendments to RCW 11.94.010(3)
Because encouraging people to draft medical durable powers of
attorney for health care is a valuable tool in preserving patient
autonomy, the durable powers of attorney statute must also reflect
current reality. Additionally, because the individual to whom the
incompetent patient has given his or her durable power of attorney is
one of the potential decisionmakers under the proposed RCW
7.70.065, these two statutes must be consistent with each other.
Currently, RCW 11.04.010(3), the statute authorizing durable
powers of attorney, excludes as potential decisionmakers anyone who
is affiliated with the health care facility where the incompetent patient
is being treated, unless that person is the incompetent patient's spouse,
adult child, brother or sister. Curiously, parents are not exempted.
Consequently, if the incompetent patient has given a durable power of
attorney to a parent or anyone other than the three classes listed above,
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and that person is a nurse, physician, administrator, janitor, secretary
in the marketing department or any other employee of the facility
where the incompetent patient is being treated, the durable power of
attorney is void.
The intent of RCW 11.94.010(3) is, obviously, to preserve patient
autonomy by allowing the patient to give someone close to them their
durable power of attorney while at the same time preventing conflicts
of interest between the health care provider and the patient. Similar
to RCW 7.70.065, the pool of close "family" members who are likely
to be considered close family members by the incompetent patient is
limited to spouse, children and siblings.9 To correct this erroneous
assumption, RCW 11.94.010(3) should be amended in the following
way:
Revisions to RCW 11.94.010(3) Power of Attorney Designation
(3) A principal may authorize his or her attorney-in-fact to provide
informed consent for health care decisions on the principal's behalf.
Unless he or she is qualified to serve as a proxy decisionmaker
under RCW 7.70.065(2)(c) [proposed version], none of the following
persons may act as the attorney-in-fact for the principal: Any of the
principal's physicians, the physicians' employees, or the owners,
administrators, or employees of the health care facility where the
principal resides or receives care. This authorization is subject to
the same limitations that apply to a guardian under RCW
11.92.040(3)(a) through (d).
G. Application of the New Statutes to the Illustrations
Having outlined a new statutory release for proxy decisionmaking,
this section of the Comment returns to the illustrations and examines
the results under the proposed proxy decision-making statute and the
proposed Washington Patient Self-Determination Act.
To begin with, if the proposed Washington Patient Self-Determi-
nation Act were to be enacted, physicians would be required to discuss
a patient's right to formulate an advance care directive or the patient's
right to appoint a medical durable power of attorney. Furthermore,
physicians would be required to (1) document in the patient's medical
records whether the patient has executed an advance care directive or
medical durable power of attorney and (2) request that the patient send
a copy of this document to the physician so that the document could
be included in the patient's medical records. As a result of these
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.94.010(3) (1996).
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requirements, some of the individuals in the seven illustrations may
have executed an advance care directive or medical durable power of
attorney prior to becoming incompetent. If any of the individuals in
the illustration had executed an advance care directive or medical
durable power of attorney, the individual's choice of proxy decision-
maker or choice of treatment would have been documented. The
individual's autonomy would have been preserved and the situations,
discussed in the illustrations, of a family member who was unfamiliar
with the patient's wishes being appointed as proxy would not have
arisen.
It is possible that some of the individuals in the illustration may
never have visited a physician prior to becoming incompetent or that,
despite receiving the information on advance care directives or medical
durable power of attorney, the individual may not have executed either
document. If no advance care directive or medical durable power of
attorney were executed, the proxy medical decision-making statute
would determine who made decisions for the patient. Each of the
seven illustrations is revisited in the paragraphs below to show the
differing results in who is appointed proxy decisionmaker under the old
and new statutes.
In Illustration 1, Derrick was twenty-nine and incompetent
because of a rare genetic disorder. His mother, who had been his
primary caretaker, wanted to authorize an experimental treatment
which was risky, but the only chance of saving Derrick's life.
Derrick's express wish had been to utilize any treatment that might
possibly save his life. Derrick's father refused to consent to the
treatment. Because the current version of the proxy medical decision-
making statute requires both parents' consent, consent was not
obtained for the treatment. Derrick's mother's next step would have
to be to seek appointment as Derrick's guardian. Under the proposed
proxy decision-making statute, the physician would have referred the
case to the hospital ethics committee when the parents could not
achieve consensus. The hospital ethics committee would probably
have appointed Derrick's mother as proxy because she had been
Derrick's primary caretaker and because she was following Derrick's
express wishes. During the course of the discussions with the hospital
ethics committee, Derrick's father may also have changed his mind and
have agreed that the treatment was appropriate. However, only one
parent's consent would have been necessary under the proposed proxy
decision-making statute. If Derrick's father remained strongly opposed
to the treatment, he could seek to be appointed as guardian for
Derrick. Thus, in this illustration, the inclusion of the hospital ethics
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committee in selecting a proxy decisionmaker would give an indepen-
dent committee the opportunity to assess which parent was more likely
to know Derrick's wishes. Furthermore, the additional step of
requiring the family to work with the hospital ethics committee may
have created consensus among the family members. That would have
avoided the costly step of seeking guardianship.
In Illustration 2, Jasmine and Charlie were unmarried partners.
Because unmarried partners are not permitted to be proxies under the
current proxy decision-making statute, Jasmine could not make medical
decisions for Charlie. Under the proposed proxy decision-making
statute, Jasmine could be a proxy medical decisionmaker for Charlie.
In Illustration 3, twenty-one-year-old Monique had been raised by
her grandmother. Under the current proxy decision-making statute,
Monique's grandmother could not make medical decisions for Monique
when Monique became incompetent. Rather, doctors had to rely on
Monique's absentee mother to make medical decisions. Under the
proposed proxy medical decision-making statute, Monique's grand-
mother could legally make medical decisions for Monique. Thus,
under the proposed statute someone who had raised and had known
Monique all of Monique's life could make medical decisions for
Monique, rather than someone who though a closer blood relation, did
not know Monique as well.
In Illustration 4, under the current statute, Doug's life partner,
Richard, could not make medical decisions for Doug when Doug
became incompetent due to AIDS. Under the proposed proxy medical
decision-making statute, Richard, Doug's partner, could become
Doug's proxy decisionmaker.
In Illustration 5, under the current statute, physicians would have
had to have turned to Kathryn's estranged husband to obtain consent
for Kathryn's medical treatment. Under the proposed proxy decision-
making statute, because the hierarchy of family decision makers would
be eliminated, Kathryn's parents could make medical decisions for
Kathryn. If both Kathryn's estranged husband and Kathryn's parents
wished to be the proxy decisionmaker, the doctor would ask the family
members to try to reach a consensus about Kathryn's treatment. If
consensus were not achieved, the hospital ethics committee would
select as proxy the person who the committee felt best knew Kathryn's
wishes. Whoever was not selected as proxy could petition the court to
be appointed as guardian for Kathryn, as is currently the case. Under
the current proxy medical decision-making statute's hierarchy,
Kathryn's parents could not be Kathryn's proxy decisionmakers and
Kathryn's estranged husband would automatically become Kathryn's
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proxy. Under the proposed statute it is quite likely that Kathryn's
parents would become her proxy medical decisionmaker, after the
hospital ethics committee assessed whether Kathryn's parents or
Kathryn's estranged husband was more likely to know Kathryn's
wishes.
In Illustration 6, Diane's cousin, her closest living family member,
could not be appointed proxy under the current proxy medical
decision-making statute because cousins are not listed in the statutory
hierarchy. Under the proposed proxy medical decision-making statute,
Diane's cousin would be permitted to act as Diane's proxy medical
decisionmaker.
Similar to Illustration 6, in Illustration 7, Eileen's close friend of
forty years could not be appointed as a proxy decisionmaker for Eileen
under the current proxy decision-making statute, because close friends
are not listed in the statutory hierarchy. However, under the proposed
proxy decision-making statute, Eileen's lifelong friend could be Eileen's
proxy because people who have "demonstrated a sincere, long-standing
interest in the welfare of the incompetent patient" may act as proxies.
In sum, as each of the recaps for the illustrations shows, by
eliminating the hierarchy in the proxy medical decision-making statute
and by broadening the definition of family in the statute, people who
are closer to the incompetent patient and, thus, more likely to know the
patient's wishes will be appointed proxy. Furthermore, by encouraging
people to draft advance care directives or medical durable power of
attorney, more people will choose their own proxy or articulate their
own wishes for medical treatment prior to becoming incompetent. As
a result of encouraging people to make medical decisions for them-
selves prior to becoming incompetent and by making the proxy medical
decision-making statute more flexible, the incompetent patient's
autonomy will be preserved.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although Washington's proxy decision-making statutes are
intended to preserve patient autonomy by allowing those who are
closest to the patient to make medical decisions for the incompetent
patient, the statute may achieve the opposite result for as many as one-
third of Washington's residents. For individuals whose family does
not mirror the family structure in RCW 7.70.065, their closest family
members are excluded from the proxy statute. It is unlikely that the
legislature intended this effect. However, because RCW 7.70.065
relies on a concept of family that is a reality for some, but not all
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Washingtonians, the statute fails to preserve patient autonomy for
many Washington residents.
Washington's proxy decision-making statute is intended to
preserve patient autonomy by identifying people who are likely to be
close enough to the incompetent patient to know the incompetent
patient's wishes. It is not a referendum on the meaning of family. To
achieve the statute's intended purpose, the statutory framework should
be broadened and amended to include the people who are actually
likely to be closest to the incompetent patient, and, therefore, most
likely to effectuate the incompetent patient's wishes.
These changes should include: (1) requiring physicians to discuss
advance care directives and medical durable powers of attorney with
their patients, (2) amending RCW 7.70.065 to broaden the statute's
definition of family, to permit close friends who are considered family
to be proxy decisionmakers, to eliminate the statute's hierarchy of
decisionmakers, and to require families to mediate disputes about
proxy decision-making through a hospital ethics committee, and (3)
amending RCW 11.94.010(3), the durable powers of attorney statute,
so that it reflects reality and is consistent with RCW 7.70.065.
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